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Central bank communication can be defined as the provision of information by the 
central bank to the public regarding such matters as the objectives of monetary policy, 
the monetary policy strategy, the economic outlook, and the outlook for future policy 
decisions. (Blinder et al., 2008) Although such a practice used to be considered as 
obnoxious by central bankers, a fundamental shift has taken place since 1990s with 
central banks coming out of mystery and becoming more open and transparent. The 
underlying theories suggest that communication can help central banks to steer the 
financial markets by managing market expectations, and in turn influence the real 
economy. Due to the difficulty involved in examining central bank communication 
effectiveness by capturing its impact on inflation, output and employment, most of the 
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literature takes a more direct and econometrically feasible approach to measure the 
correlation between central bank communication events and the moves of financial 
market returns and volatility. A growing number of studies have been done on 
advanced central banks, whereas the research on the Chinese central bank – the 
People’s Bank of China (PBoC) – is still at its primary stage. This dissertation attempts 
to measure the impact of PBoC communication on financial markets, as a forthright 
approach to examine the effectiveness of central bank communication in China, and 
then draw some pertinent implications.  
 
After a review of theories of central bank communication and its connection with 
financial markets, I conduct an empirical research employing an EGARCH model to 
capture both the “price effect” and the “volatility effect” of central bank 
communication on Chinese financial markets. Daily data of asset returns in money 
markets, bond markets, stock markets and foreign exchange markets from October 
2006 to September 2015 are used. A comparison of three sub periods is done as well, to 
reflect the variant results before, during and after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Moreover, in order to understand communication’s importance relative to monetary 
policy instruments for the PBoC, I also compare its impact on financial markets with 
that of the benchmark lending and deposit rate changes, the reserve requirement ratio 
adjustments and the open market operations etc.  
 
The results show that throughout the sample period PBoC communication 
iii 
 
generally moves the interest rates as well as the stock market returns toward its desired 
direction and also influences financial market volatilities in a statistically significant 
way, and that PBoC communication has been playing an increasingly important role in 
efficiently managing market expectations and promoting monetary policy effectiveness 
after the 2008 global financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in relative terms - 
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1. Background and motivation 
 
In a then best-seller book published nearly three decades ago - “Secrets of the Temple: 
How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country” (Greider, 1987), the Federal Reserve (Fed) 
was described to be secretive, tight-lipped and remote, who did not even announce its 
policy decisions, let alone explained them. Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Fed, 
was the archetype of an equivocating central banker, who said “since I’ve become a 
central banker, I’ve learned to mumble with great incoherence. If I seem unduly clear 
to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.” (Quotes in Wall Street Journal, 
September 22, 1987) This was true not only for the Fed, but also for all the other 
central banks in the world at that time. However, a fundamental shift has taken place 
since 1990s with central banks coming out of mystery and becoming more open and 
transparent. Greater importance has been put on communication in order to deliver 
higher monetary policy effectiveness. Frederic Mishkin speaks of a “revolution in the 
way central banks communicate with the markets and the public” (2004). After the 
global financial crisis, central bank communication became even more active as an 
unconventional measure to achieve central bank goals. Particularly, forward guidance 
has been used by the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England 
(BoE) to guide the market expectations for low long-term interest rates, in order to 
boost the economic recovery. Literature on central bank communication has been 





Since 2006, Chinese central bank - the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) - has been 
putting more weight on communication as well. Governor Zhou Xiaochuan was 
reported to advocate that monetary policy should go to the market “as expected” rather 
than “by surprise”. Despite the PBoC’s efforts to improve its communication, there is 
still a big gap between the communication practices of the PBoC and those of the Fed 
or the ECB. In terms of communication, the PBoC has been ranked third-worst of 14 
big central banks as reported by a Barclays survey in 2014. According to a broader 
index of transparency constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014), the PBoC scored 
4 over 15 in 2010, similarly as Bahrain, Bangladesh, Maldives and Venezuela. 
 
2. Research design 
 
The focus of this dissertation is on the effectiveness of PBoC’s communication in spite 
of its relatively low level of transparency. This dissertation aims to 1) summarize the 
underlying theories of central bank communication as well as its connection with 
financial markets, 2) answer the main research question “how effectively has the PBoC 
been communicating?” by conducting an empirical study on the impact of PBoC 
communication on Chinese financial markets including both a price effect and a 
volatility effect, and 3) draw some pertinent implications. 
Since the literature on the impact of central bank communication on financial markets 
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in China is still limited in both quantitative and qualitative senses, study done in this 
dissertation may add to the literature with an updated empirical analysis. What distincts 
this dissertation from the existing literature is that it not only examines the overall 
impact of central bank communication on the Chinese financial markets during the 
sample period but also compares the results before, during and after the recent global 
financial crisis for the first time, as far as I know. However, since this study involves 
subjective judgments of monetary stance bias communicated by the PBoC, 
measurement errors can be possible in some cases, which is one of the potential 
weaknesses of this study. Besides, verbal communication contents are searched out 
with a search engine on the Internet, which may not cover all relevant information. A 
more reliable newswire may be used in future research. 
 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section II gives an overall 
introduction of central bank communication theories followed by a more specific 
discussion on the connection between central bank communication and financial 
markets. Section III selectively reviews the literature on central bank communication 
effectiveness in major developed countries and in China. Most of the literature takes 
the econometrically convenient approach to perform this task by examining central 
bank communication’s impact on financial markets, as this dissertation does. In section 
IV, I present my research methodology and data selection. To measure the influence of 
PBoC communication on both the asset price levels and volatilities in financial markets, 
an EGARCH model is constructed involving a variable which quantifies central bank 
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communication taking a narrative approach. Section V reports the empirical results and 
interprets them. Three key questions are answered in this section: 1) Whether 
communication has helped the PBoC in moving financial asset prices and influencing 
financial market volatilities in the desired way? 2) How has the role of communication 
changed after the global financial crisis? 3) What’s the importance of communication 
compared with central bank monetary policy instruments in moving financial markets? 





II. Understanding central bank communication 
 
The very first question to deal with is: what is the definition of central bank 
communication? Blinder et al. define central bank communication as “the provision of 
information by the central bank to the public regarding such matters as the objectives 
of monetary policy, the monetary policy strategy, the economic outlook, and the 
outlook for future policy decisions” (2008). These information was kept almost 
completely secretive before the 1990s, while has become increasingly available to the 
public afterwards. Thus, there comes another important question: what are the 
theoretical foundations of these two distinct ways of thinking adopted by central banks 
earlier and now? The following sub-section reviews the related theories. 
 
1. Underlying theories 
 
There are distinct theoretical foundations behind central banks’ two different ways of 
thinking and behavior. In the new classical economics, all agents are assumed to 
maximize utility based on rational expectations. This kind of expectations is defined by 
the Rational Expectations theory as being identical to the optimal forecast that uses all 
available information. Therefore, rational expectations do not differ from equilibrium 
results systematically or predictably. Through price and wage adjustment, the economy 
runs at the equilibrium level with full employment and achieves its potential output, at 
any time. Sargent and Wallace, applying rational expectations, produced the 
Policy-Ineffectiveness Proposition (1975, 1976), according to which, no matter what 
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monetary policy the central bank employed, agents would foresee the effects and 
expect wage and price to change accordingly. As a result, wage and price move 
instantly; real wages remain constant and so does output. This implies that 
only unanticipated shocks to the economy are able to cause deviations from 
equilibrium. Influenced by these theories, for a long period, central banks believed that 
their goals could be achieved only with unexpected and cryptic monetary policies. It 
was believed that the effectiveness of monetary policy is directly proportional to the 
monetary policy shocks (the information is provided by surprising market actors) 
(Brunner, 1981), while communication and transparency were considered as impolitic 
which could harm the effectiveness of monetary policies. (Blinder et al, 2008)  
 
On the other hand, although New Keynesian macroeconomics also assumes that 
households and firms have rational expectations, it acknowledges the stickiness of 
wage and price, which implies that it normally takes a long time before the market 
re-clear in case of shocks. Most of the time, the economy operates at a non-equilibrium 
level. Since market decisions are made mainly based on expectations about the future 
rather than the situations today, central banks should communicate with the market to 
influence their expectations, in order to improve monetary policy effectiveness. The 
view that monetary policy is, at least in part, about managing expectations is by now 
standard fare both in academia and in central banking circles. (Blinder et al, 2008) For 
example, Woodford argues that the success of monetary policy is not guaranteed just 
by controlling short-term interest rates, but also by influencing market expectations in 
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the desired direction (2005). 
 
In a survey done in 2008, Blinder et al. summarized a good explanation of why central 
bank communication can matter. The basic idea is that in an unrealistic financial 
system with not only rational expectations, but also symmetric information and 
stationary economic environment, there is no room for central bank communication to 
play an independent role. However, as deviations from these conditions are the norm 
but not the exception, which include asymmetric information and non-stationary 
economic environment, central bank communication becomes relevant for policy 
actions.  
 
A related concept to central bank communication is central bank transparency. 
According to Geraats, an economic definition of transparency is the absence of 
asymmetric information. In the case of perfect transparency, all agents are equally 
well-informed (2014). Whereas transparency requires central banks to provide 
information to the general public as much and as soon as possible, central bank 
communication is intentionally designed to manipulate the expectations and behaviors 
of economic actors by providing certain information, with the purpose of achieving 
central bank goals such as price stability. Therefore, there is clear distinction between 
central bank communication and transparency. Indeed, central bank communication 
may facilitate transparency, but not for transparency per se, and sometimes too much 
transparency does bad rather than good. In other words, “the more information, the 
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better” is not always true. A broadly criticized communicator is then-ECB President 
Wim Duisenberg, who, in October 2000, hinted to an interviewer that the ECB would 
not make any further intervention to support the euro. This thoughtless communication 
caused the euro to depreciate immediately. Amato, Morris, and Shin emphasize this 
point by highlighting the double-edged nature of public information when used for 
policy purposes - while it is very effective in influencing actions through coordination, 
sometimes it can be too effective and coordinate actions away from fundamentals 
(2002).  
 
Dale, Orphanides and Österholm (2011) consider the potential benefits and limitations 
of central bank communication in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning and 
argue that the mantra of “more information is always better” is neither sufficient nor 
correct. They point out that because of imperfect information, central bank 
communication may play a role to inform and improve the public’s understanding, or, 
to distract and mislead. This implies that there may be costs associated with publishing 
uncertain information, and that central banks should focus their communication on the 
information they really know about.  
 
In contrast, Geraats provides an economic explanation for the role of oblique 
communication and argues that the optimal communication strategy for a central bank 
is to provide clarity about the inflation target but to provide information with perceived 
ambiguity about the output-gap target and supply shocks (2007). All of these point to a 
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policy implication, which is, before conducting communication, central banks should 
be clear about their objectives, what messages they want to deliver, what responses 
they hope to receive from the market, and make a tactical plan on what information to 
publish, when and how. 
 
2. Central bank communication and financial markets 
 
This sub-section moves on to discuss the efficacy of central bank communication in 
managing market expectations and promoting monetary policy effectiveness. As 
explained in the previous section, central bank communication is supposed to be able 
to finally affect inflation, employment and output levels through the expectation 
channel. This process is illustrated in Figure 1 - central bank communication 
influences money market interest rates and other financial asset prices and those prices 
continue to impose effect on the real economy. However, though financial markets 
move quickly with central bank communication, financial prices affect the economy 
only gradually - with the proverbial long and variable lags. These time lags combined 
with many other macro variables that are exerting influence on the economy at the 
same time make it prohibitively difficult to analysis the impact of central bank 
communication on the real economy. In contrast, the impact of central bank 
communication on financial markets is, like monetary policy instruments, instant and 




Figure 1. Central bank communication and financial markets 
 
 
Edited by the author of this dissertation based on a typical monetary transmission mechanism illustrated 
by the ECB 
 
A relevant question to ask here is: how does the so-called expectation channel function 
in moving financial markets along with central bank communication at all? A number 
of factors could come into play here. First, the central bank can move financial markets 
by “creating news”, since it is an important player in financial markets, the 
communication about its impending actions - such as raising or decreasing the policy 
rates - can affect asset prices directly. This channel has also been labeled the “signaling 
channel” in the literature. Second, central bank communication can also influence 
financial markets by “reducing noises”. As central banks normally hold both 
qualitatively and quantitatively better information than the public and have better 
technical as well as analytical capacities, communication by central banks might play a 
11 
 
role as a coordination device, thereby reducing heterogeneity in expectations and 
information and thus inducing asset prices to more closely reflect the underlying 
fundamentals. This “coordination channel” might imply that central bank 
communication has longer-lasting effects, as they might change the dynamics in 
financial markets. 
 
Anchoring and guiding market expectations to improve the effectiveness of monetary 
policy instruments are not the only part that central bank communication can play. As 
pointed out by Blinder et al., in extreme circumstances, communication may even 
become the major tool of monetary policy (2008). This prominent role seems to be 
particular relevant during the recent global financial crisis: “As long as the current 
overnight rate is stuck at or near zero, central bank communication about expected 
future rates becomes the essence of monetary policy” (Blinder et al., 2008). This 
so-called “forward guidance” type of central bank communication has been frequently 
used by the Fed, the ECB and the BoE and is dubbed as one of the two most important 
unconventional monetary policies (the other one is Quantitative Easing). 
 
3. Practice of major central banks 
 
After reviewing related theories, I turn to the communication practices of central banks. 
A notable change in central banks’ strategy in the recent years has been the movement 
towards a progressive communication of monetary policy decisions, of the main 
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objectives that central banks pursue and also their projection regarding future 
developments in the economy, by these enhancing central banks actions. (Tomuleasa, 
2015) The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was the pioneer and is still among 
the most advanced central banks worldwide in terms of open communication. The 
Kiwis got the ball rolling in 1998 and other central banks followed more or less 
quickly and decisively in a variety of ways since then (Hughes and Kesting, 2014). In 
the developed world, communication, as a potential powerful tool to pursue monetary 
policy goals, is getting more attention from academia and central banks themselves. 
There seems to be even a race to become the champion of transparency: “An explosion 
of interest in the subject of central bank communication has been seen in recent years. 
Whereas at one time clever obfuscation was prized, now there is almost a competition 
to be the most transparent. Central banks are graded on how they speak, and how they 
write, with those achieving low grades questioning most strongly the validity of the 
criteria used. The Bank of England, winner of the writing competition, prides itself as 
achieving substantially improved policy effectiveness by harnessing the power of 
transparency” (Archer, 2005). Below I briefly introduce the central bank 
communication practices of two of the world’s major central banks - the Fed and the 
ECB. 
 
As recorded by Blinder et al. (2008), the Fed’s communication practices can date back 
to February 1994, when the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) first announced 
its decisions on the target of federal funds rate. Five years later, the FOMC statements 
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started to contain the content assessing its inclination with respect to future monetary 
policy changes. It began issuing fuller statements, even when there was no change to 
interest rates. In 2002, the FOMC votes became available to the public right after each 
meeting. Since February 2005, the FOMC has been publishing its meeting minutes 
before the subsequent meeting. After reaching the zero lower bound in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed has frequently communicated with households, 
businesses, and investors about the stance of monetary policy expected to prevail in the 
future, with a (conditional) commitment.  
 
To make its monetary policy understood by the public as best as possible, the ECB puts 
considerable weight on communicating effectively and interacting properly with the 
public. According to Issing (2014), the ECB has been using a broad spectrum of 
communication tools since the euro was created in January 1999. A press conference 
including a Q&A session is held with the president explaining the monetary policy 
decisions after every monetary policy decision meeting. Transcripts of the press 
conference become available on the ECB website a few hours later. Usually one week 
after the first meeting of the Governing Council every month, the Monthly Bulletin 
provides encompassing information on the economic and financial background for the 
decision made. Projections and a number of special reports such as the Financial 
Stability Review are also published regularly. The members of the Executive Board 




4. Practice of the People’s Bank of China 
 
China still has a non-fully-liberalized financial system, in which asymmetric 
information is the norm. Moreover, since the economy is still in a transitional process 
towards a market system, the public might have not learnt to understand intentions 
from observed data. This makes communication extremely important for the central 
bank of China to fulfill its mandate. The PBoC received its mandate to operate as a 
central bank in 1983. Unlike its Western counterparts, the PBoC is not fully 
independent from the government as it reports directly to China’s cabinet, the State 
Council. China’s monetary policy has been gradually moving towards that of 
developed countries not only in terms of deeds but also words. (Garcia-Herrero and 
Girardin, 2013) Short-term interest rates started to be used as an operational target by 
the PBoC in the late 1990s. Now the publishing of Quarterly Monetary Reports and 
statements summarizing the meetings of its Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) are 
common practice of the PBoC communication. The governing body of the PBoC, 
especially the governor Zhou Xiaochuan has also become much more active in 
delivering speeches on monetary policy stance and the outlook for the Chinese 
economy through press conferences and media interviews.   
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III. Literature review 
 
With central bank communication getting increasing attention among central bankers 
and academia since a couple of decades ago, literature on central bank communication 
has been growing steadily. Most of the literature deals with central bank 
communication through an empirical approach, centering on a key question whether 
central bank communication is indeed making a difference in reality as the theory 
predicts. As mentioned in Section II, due to the difficulty of identifying the 
effectiveness of central bank communication in influencing output, inflation and 
employment level, most of the empirical research of central bank communication 
focuses on examining the impacts of central bank communication on financial markets. 
Among these studies, some focus on examining whether a central bank communication 
event leads to any reaction in financial markets at all, while some others go a step 
further to identify not only the moves of financial asset prices but also the directions of 
them. Observing whether the financial asset prices move in the central bank intended 
direction requires defining the intent of central bank communication. The common 
practice is to use linguistic methods to code central bank communication contents, by 
assigning positive values to contents that are perceived as delivering a message of 
tightening or hawkish monetary inclination, negative values to those loosing or dovish 
messages, and zero to those that appear to be neutral. This is also the approach that 
almost all the literature on communication of PBoC has taken. While much research 
was done on central banks of major advanced countries, such as the Fed, the ECB and 
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the BoE, so far there is relatively limited study on the communication of the PBoC. 
The rest of this section selectively reviews those studies. 
 
1. Literature on major central banks 
 
Alan Blinder and co-authors provide a comprehensive literature review on central bank 
communication in the pages of the Journal of Economic Literature, issue 46, in 2008, 
based on which Peter Hughes and Stefan Kesting come up with an updated review on 
this topic which is published in the On the Horizon in 2014. In this sub-section, I 
include only a few most influential works in this field of study. 
 
Ehrman and Fratzscher (2007) analyze and compare the effectiveness of 
communication by the Fed, the BoE, and the ECB. Their key argument is that the 
effectiveness of communication is not independent from the decision-making process. 
In other words, because of the different communication strategies and decision-making 
processes taken by these central banks, the effectiveness of their communication may 
present distinctive features. According to their observation, the Fed has been pursuing a 
highly individualistic communication strategy amid a collegial approach to decision 
making, while the BoE is using a collegial communication strategy and highly 
individualistic decision making. The ECB has chosen a collegial approach both in its 
communication and in its decision making. Ehrman and Fratzscher define the 
effectiveness of central bank communication as containing two elements - the ability of 
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financial markets to predict future monetary policy decisions and the ability of policy 
makers to influence financial markets by moving asset prices. Their empirical research 
presents four key findings. First, the predictability of policy decisions is highest for the 
Fed and the ECB, and lower for the BoE. Second, asset prices react strongest to 
communication by the Fed and the ECB. Third, U.S. markets react significantly 
stronger to statements by then-Chairman Greenspan and less to statements by others, 
whereas euro area markets respond to communication by the ECB president and other 
officials to a very similar extent. Fourth, U.S. markets react to statements both about 
the monetary policy inclination and the economic outlook, whereas UK and euro area 
markets respond mostly only to communication about monetary policy, a difference 
that most likely reflects also the different market perceptions of policy reaction 
functions. 
 
2. Literature on the People’s Bank of China 
 
The analysis of central bank communication in China is in development as well, albeit 
not fully fledged. Ji and Song (2012) investigate the short-term impact of the PBoC 
communication on financial markets by analyzing data from October 2006 to June 
2011 with an EGARCH model. The result shows that PBoC communication 
significantly moves short-term returns (1-month and 3-month Shanghai Interbank 
Offered Rate) toward the intended direction. However, the impact is smaller than the 
effect of monetary policies. Another finding is that PBoC communication plays a role 
18 
 
in stabilizing financial markets, but the effect is not significant enough to offset the 
volatility caused by the surprising elements of policy decisions. Furthermore, by 
comparing PBoC communication with a tightening inclination and communication 
with a loosening inclination, Ji and Song find that the effectiveness of tightening 
communication is bigger than that of loosening communication. Their further analysis 
shows a stronger effectiveness of verbal communication than written communication, 
and a stronger effectiveness of communication providing information about monetary 
policy stance than communication talking about macroeconomic prospects. 
 
Garcia-Herrero and Girardin (2013) empirically assess the impact of PBoC 
communication on China’s overnight repo market, which is considered to be the most 
active and liquid segment of the money market in China. Both the effects on prices 
(direct effects) and volumes (indirect effects) are measured. By recording all the 
speeches delivered by PBoC’s governing body, they construct a higher frequency (daily) 
indicator of the PBoC communication since the mid 2000s. The empirical results show 
that following communication from the PBoC’s governing body, the volatility and 
volume of overnight repo market change immediately, which means China’s monetary 
markets “listen to” the PBoC. They also find a statistically significant rise in interbank 
rates right after PBoC communication with a tightening inclination, indicating that 
China’s monetary markets also “understand” the PBoC’s messages. Based on this 
evidence, they conclude that communication of the PBoC works effectively in 
affecting China’s money markets.  
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Using a structural VAR model, Zhang and Hu (2013) focus on the reactions of stock 
market to PBoC communication during the period of 2003-2012 and find that PBoC 
communication reduces the volatility of stock prices, but the significance of the effect 
is limited. They also find verbal communication is more effective than written 
communication. 
 
Wu and Pan (2014) use an EGARCH model to examine the impact of PBoC 
communication on financial asset prices, covering a period from October 2006 to 
September 2012. Their empirical result shows that PBoC communication has certain 
influence on financial asset prices with a direction as intended, but the impact is not 
significant, especially for long term interest rates. As Ji and Song (2012), Wu and Pan 
also note a more significant impact of verbal communication compared with written 
communication on financial asset prices. The final finding of their research is that the 





IV. Data and methodology 
 
As explained in previous sections, to examine the effectiveness of central bank 
communication, an econometrically practical approach is to analyze the reaction of 
financial markets to central bank communication. A normal practice to do this is to 
observe both the financial asset return changes and its volatility. The underlying 
hypothesis is that effective central bank communication should move the financial 
asset returns toward the desired direction by providing information that is perceived by 
the market as new and relevant or reducing noises, ceteris paribus. In theory, if the 
communication of the PBoC does make a difference, it should drive up interest rates, 
cause the Chinese Yuan to appreciate relative to other currencies, while drive down 
stock market yields in the case of tightening monetary inclination. The impact should 
be opposite when the PBoC messages convey loosening monetary bias. However, a 
debatable issue is whether the volatility should rise or reduce with the presence of 
effective central bank communication. This issue is dealt with later in this section. 
 
1. Measuring communication of the People’s Bank of China 
 
I examine the impact of communication of the PBoC on financial markets throughout a 
period from October 2006 to September 2015. The reason why I choose October 2006 
as the starting date of my sample period is that it is in this year that the governor Zhou 
Xiaochuan started to put more weight on communication, and it is from October 2006 
that most of the Chinese financial market indices became publicly available.  
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First, as a normal practice, I categorize communication of the PBoC into written 
communication and verbal communication. Written communication includes the 
PBoC’s quarterly Monetary Policy Reports and the statements summarizing the 
meetings of its MPC. Each issue of the quarterly Monetary Policy Reports provides 
information on the PBoC’s prospect of Chinese economy and its monetary policy 
inclination in the periods ahead, in addition to a review of monetary policy 
implementation in the past quarter as well as an analysis of currency credit, financial 
markets and the macro economy. Statements of the quarterly meetings of the MPC 
contains similar information but with condensed contents. These two series of reports 
are available on the official website of the PBoC. As for the verbal communication, I 
first identify key policy makers and their terms of office in the PBoC, and then in the 
most commonly used Chinese search engine, Baidu.com, I search their statements, 
speeches and interviews reported within the sample period and their respective terms of 
office on a daily basis. The search commands I employ are the name of the policy 
maker together with one of the terms “monetary policy”, “interest rates”, “reserve 
requirement ratio” and “inflation”. I keep only forward-looking statements and discard 
those that explain the most recent policy decision that had been made at the time. In 
other words, only statements containing monetary policy inclination are recorded. 
Moreover, only the first report on each communication event is included in the sample, 
since the objective is to examine the real-time impact of PBoC communication on 
financial markets. I ignore those MPC members who are not officials in the PBoC, 
because the MPC is an advisory agency which is constituted with the governor, some 
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vice governors and leaders of related departments, representatives of banking industry 
as well as scholars, whose responsibility is mainly to provide advices rather than to 
make decisions. In fact, those MPC members seldom make any statement about 
monetary policy. It is the PBoC who has the authority to make monetary policy 
decisions (of course, under the supervision of the State Council). The policy makers 




















In the second step, I follow the commonly used narrative approach to quantify the 
PBoC communication contents. Specifically, all communications are classified 
according to their implications for the likely future path of interest rates. The rule is: 
when a report or statement conveys an inclination of tightening monetary policy stance, 
it takes the value of 1; when the communication event implies a bias toward loosening 
monetary policy stance, it takes the value of -1; all the other communication is given a 
value of 0. It is important to stress that this classification and valuation involves a 
degree of subjective judgment and thus does not rule out possible measurement errors 
in some cases. Table 1 provides a summary of the classification. 
                                                             
1
 Governor of the PBoC since December 2012. 
2
 Vice governor of the PBoC from April 2001 to December 2007. 
3
 Vice governor of the PBoC from November 2003 to June 2010. 
4
 Vice governor of the PBoC since December 2007. 
5
 Vice governor of the PBoC from June 2006 to October 2014. 
6
 Vice governor of the PBoC from December 2007 to November 2011. 
7
 Vice governor of the PBoC from July 2009 to February 2015. 
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Tightening Neutral Loosening Total 
Written Communication 
Monetary Policy Reports 8 19 9 36 
MPC Announcements 8 21 8 37 
Sub-total 16 40 17 73 
Percentage 22% 55% 23% 100% 
Verbal Communication 
Zhou Xiaochuan 37 39 15 91 
Wu Xiaoling 8 0 0 8 
Su Ning 4 3 10 17 
Yi Gang 7 9 8 24 
Liu Shiyu 2 1 2 5 
Ma Delun 3 2 0 5 
Hu Xiaolian 1 7 0 8 
Guo Qingping 2 0 1 3 
Sub-total 64 61 36 161 
Percentage 40% 38% 22% 100% 
Total Total 80 101 53 234 
Percentage 34% 43% 23% 100% 
 
During the sample period, the PBoC released 36 quarterly Monetary Policy Reports 
and 37 MPC announcements. Among these written communications, tightening 
monetary stance, neutral monetary stance and loosening monetary stance were 
delivered 16 times (22%), 40 times (55%) and 17 times (23%), respectively. The 
samples include 161 verbal communications by the PBoC officials, among which 
messages about tightening monetary inclination were delivered 64 times (40%); neutral 
61 times (38%); loosening 36 times (22%). Compared with written communication, 
verbal communication tends to be more conservative. Among communicators of the 
24 
 
PBoC, the governor Zhou Xiaochuan plays the key role, who communicates with the 
market and public most frequently. In summary, the entire sample includes 234 
communications, among which 34% deliver a tightening monetary policy inclination, 
23% convey a loosening monetary policy inclination and others are neutral in terms of 
future monetary stance. 
 
2. Financial market data selection 
 
China has already basically established money, bond, stock, insurance, gold, foreign 
exchange and financial derivatives markets. My study focuses on the reactions of the 
money market, the bond market, the stock market and the foreign exchange market to 
PBoC communication. I opt for money market interest rates of different maturities, 
government bond yields, daily stock yields and the exchange rate of US dollar to 
Chinese Yuan as the indicators of asset prices in these financial markets. Specifically, 
the money market interest rates include overnight Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate 
(Shibor), 1-week Shibor, 2-week Shibor, 1-month Shibor, 3-month Shibor, 6-month 
Shibor, 9-month Shibor and 1-year Shibor. For the bond market, government bond 
yields of 2-year, 5-year and 10-year maturities are selected. As for stock yield rates, I 
use the daily yields of Shanghai Composite Index and the Shenzhen Component Index, 
which are differences of the natural logarithm of closing prices in these markets, i.e. 
Stock_SHt=Ln(P_SHt)-Ln(P_SHt-1); Stock_SZt=Ln(P_SZt)-Ln(P_SZt-1). In the foreign 
exchange market, I examine the daily changes of USD/CNY central parity rate, since 
this rate is still the most important one in the Chinese foreign exchange market. The 
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daily change rates are obtained by taking the difference of the natural logarithm 
USD/CNY central parity rate of day t and the previous trading day, i.e. 
ERt=Ln(Et)-Ln(Et-1). I use the negative of these values because the purpose is to 
examine the price of CNY in terms of USD. This variable is defined as ER_CNY/USD.  
 
The Shibor data is extracted from the official Shibor website; the data of government 
bond yields and the stock markets data are obtained from the WIND database
9
; the 
exchange rate data is from the website of State Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
From October 2006 to December 2013, Shibor rates were released on the official 
website at 11:30 am on every trading day, while since January 2014, the releasing time 
of Shibor rates has been changed to 9:30 am on each trading day. The increase or 
decrease of Shibor rates reflects the shocks occurring between the releasing time on the 
previous day and the releasing time on the current day. As bond market closes at 4:30 
pm on trading days, the change of bond yields reflects shocks that take place between 
4:30 pm on the previous trading day and 4:30 pm on the current day. Similarly, 
changes of stock market yield rates reflect shocks between 3:00 pm on trading day t-1 
and 3:00 pm on trading day t, since the closing time of stock market is 3:00pm. Foreign 
exchange market closed at 5:30 pm before December 13, 2010, and closed at 4:30 pm 
ever after, so exchange rate changes reflect shocks appearing after closing time on 
trading day t-1 and before closing time on trading day t.  
 
                                                             
9
 http://www.wind.com.cn/En/  
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The descriptive statistics of these financial market variables are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the financial market variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.  Skewness Kurtosis 
Shibor_1d 2249 2.379297 1.087204 1.888876 12.36892 
Shibor_1w 2249 3.017202 1.28334 1.076668 5.933357 
Shibor_2w 2249 3.319838 1.405439 0.797694 4.976796 
Shibor_1m 2249 3.644726 1.457205 0.418446 3.352829 
Shibor_3m 2249 3.774787 1.282491 -0.352713 2.159503 
Shibor_6m 2249 3.779026 1.157881 -0.540904 2.058244 
Shibor_9m 2249 3.852229 1.112491 -0.59915 1.999304 
Shibor_1y 2249 3.95391 1.06795 -0.613089 1.943478 
Bond_2y 2249 2.929384 0.777442 -0.403653 2.418377 
Bond_5y 2249 3.379469 0.571963 -0.062819 2.351601 
Bond_10y 2249 3.793406  0.453384 0.334159 2.209618 
Stock_SH 2187 0.000254 0.018347 -0.537475 6.459106 
Stock_SZ 2187 0.000383 0.020594 -0.449495 5.234035 
ER_CNY/USD 2184 0.0000998 0.001006 -5.046042 92.53142 
 
3. Methodology and empirical model 
 
The descriptive statistics of the financial market variables imply the propriety of using 
a type of GARCH framework. The EGARCH model corrects for the kurtosis, skewness, 
and time-varying volatility of the asset prices, therefore, following Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2007), I choose to use EGARCH model to examine the impact of PBoC 
communication on both the financial asset prices and their volatility.  
 
                                                                        
27 
 
                        
    
     
   
 
 
   
 
    
     
 
                                                 (2) 
                                      
 
The EGARCH(1,1) model formulates the conditional mean equation for the asset 
return    as a function of the PBoC communication (    ), past returns (    ), 
benchmark lending and deposit rates (   ), reserve requirement ratios (    ), the 
PBoC open market operations (    ) and the releases of macroeconomic date (   ). 
I control monetary policy instrument variables (   ,      and     ) in order to 
ensure that   captures solely the effect of the PBoC communication. As I defined 
earlier, when the communication delivers a message of tightening monetary bias, 
     takes the value of 1; when the communication contains loosening monetary 
inclination,      takes the value of -1; when the foreseen monetary stance is neutral, 
     takes the value of 0. Following the same logic, I define the value of the 
controlled variables    ,      and     : when the PBoC increases the benchmark 
lending and deposit rates,     takes the value of 1 and when the benchmark rates 
decline,     takes the value of -1. Similarly, when the PBoC increases the reserve 
requirement ratio,      is equal to 1; when it is reduced,      equals to -1. Also, 
when the PBoC issues central bank bills or sells repos,      takes the value of 1; 
when it reverses repos,      is equal to -1.     is a dummy variable in both the 
mean equation and the variance equation, which takes 1 on the days when there are 
macroeconomic data releases or 0 otherwise. I do not differentiate the direction of this 
variable because it is relatively a less important variable in my model.  
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I assume             , where    is an i.i.d. sequence with zero mean and unit 
variance. Therefore, the conditional variance ht can be expressed as a function of 
communication dummy (   ), which takes the value of 1 on days with central bank 
communication and 0 otherwise, past variance (    ) innovations (    ) and the 
control variables    ,    ,     and    . These four control variables enter the 
variance equation as dummy variables, which, respectively, take the value of 1 on days 
with announcements of benchmark lending and deposit rate changes, announcements 
of reserve requirement ratio changes, open market operations or macroeconomic data 
releases, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Rules of variable assignments are summarized below. 
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In the mean equation, I expect the coefficient signs of interest rate variables and 
foreign exchange rate variable to be positive, while the coefficient sign of the stock 
return variables is expected to be negative. To be specific, since PBoC communication 
events with a tightening inclination give      the value of +1 while those with a 
loosening inclination assign the value of -1 as stated earlier, a positive sign of the 
coefficients for Shibor and bond rates in the mean equation means yields in these 
markets increase following tightening PBoC communication and decrease in the case 
of loosening monetary inclination. Also, a negative sign of      variable coefficients 
for stock market yields indicates a decline of stock yields due to central bank 
communication with tightening inclination and a rise after communication with 
loosening inclination. If the financial asset returns react to central bank communication 
in this way, it is consistent with theoretical hypotheses and with the PBoC’s intention. 
 
The variance equation catches the rise or decline of the asset price volatility following 
central bank communication. How we should understand the rise or decline needs more 
discussion. Since the 1990s, the rise of asset price volatility has been interpreted as 
evidence that the markets listen to the central bank by the growing literature on the 
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impact of central bank communication on financial markets. The idea that endorses this 
understanding is that central bank messages may convey new information that tends to 
move the markets. However, more recently, more studies have understood mitigation in 
volatility as a sign that central bank communication calms the markets (Garcia-Herrero 
and Girardin, 2013). Therefore, whether we should expect the volatility of financial 
assets to rise or reduce following PBoC communication depends on the degree to 
which the new information surprises the markets or calms them. According to Geraats 
(2002), this, in turn, depends on the degree of uncertainty prior to an announcement by 
the central bank and also on the clarity of its messages.   
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V. Empirical results 
 
1. Overall impact 
 
First, I examine the overall impact of the central bank communication on financial 
markets in China, using the model specified above. Table 3 shows the results of the 
equation estimations. Since I focus on the influence of PBoC communication for now, 
Table 3 only reports the coefficients of the PBoC communication variables (     
and    ) while omits the coefficients of other variables in the model.  
 
In the mean equation, coefficients of      have a positive sign for seven indicators 
of money market interest rates and bond yield rates out of eleven, and a negative sign 
for both the Shanghai Composite Index and the Shenzhen Component Index. Therefore, 
we can generally say that PBoC communication affects the returns of these financial 
assets in an intended way. However, the divergence of interest rate movements is not 
negligible. Indeed, the overnight, 14-day, 1-month and 9-month Shibor rates move in a 
direction against the theoretical prediction and the PBoC’s intention as well.  
 
As for the significance, the coefficients of      for both Stock_SH and Stock_SZ are 
significant at the 5% level, but only four out of eleven coefficients for money market 
and bond market interest rate variables show a significantly positive sign. The impact 




All in all, from the mean equation, I have below observations. 1) In the money market, 
PBoC communication generally affects the interest rates in an intended way, especially 
for 3-month, 6-month and 1-year interest rates. 2) The inconsistency among moving 
directions of the interest rates with different maturities is too big to be ignored. This 
may be a demonstration of the disconnectedness of short, middle and long-term 
financial markets in China, as a result of inefficient function of the financial markets. 3) 
In the bond market, PBoC communication moves the yield rates toward its desired 
direction, and the effect is significant for 10-year government bond rate. 4) In the stock 
market, stock yields significantly react to PBoC communication in the intended way. 5) 
In the foreign exchange market, PBoC communication influences the CNY/USD 
exchange rate in its intended indirection but the impact is not significant. 
 
In the variance equation estimation, a negative sign of     variable coefficients 
means the communication reduces volatility of financial asset prices, while a positive 
sign implies an opposite impact. The result shows that PBoC communication 
significantly influences volatility of money market interest rates (except for 1-week 
shibor) and the foreign exchange rate. Specifically, it reduces the volatility of 2-week, 
1-month and 3-month Shibor in a significant way. Meanwhile, it significantly increases 
volatility of overnight, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year Shibor as well as the CNY/USD 
exchange rate. The impact on volatility of stock markets is negative but only 




As mentioned earlier, whether we should expect the volatility of financial assets to rise 
or reduce following PBoC communication depends on the degree to which new 
information surprises the markets or calms them and this, in turn, depends on the 
degree of uncertainty prior to an announcement by the central bank and also on the 
clarity of its messages. When the market situation is quite certain and there are not 
many noises, central bank communication with clear messages may raise the volatility 
of financial asset prices by “creating news”. Otherwise, when there is great uncertainty 
going on in the economy, central bank communication may confuse the market even 
more and promote the volatility by delivering ambiguous messages, or reduce the 
volatility by clarifying the situation and conveying reliable information.  
 
As we notice, the degree of market uncertainty is quite high in the case of China during 
our sample period. It experienced high inflation in 2007, financial crisis which caused 
recession in 2008, severe deflation in 2009, higher inflation expectations of economic 
rebound in 2010, slow economic growth with high inflation in 2011 and economic ups 
and downs since 2012. However, the obvious divergence among the reactions of 
different asset price volatility to PBoC communication makes this “market certainty” 
and “message clarity” explanation less relevant here. This issue is further touched upon 
in the next sub-section. Nonetheless, at least two things are certain here: first, central 
bank communication does exert significant influence on monetary market volatility; 
second, the disconnectedness between short, middle and long-term financial markets of 




Table 3. Overall impact of PBoC communication on financial markets 
 
 
Mean Equation Variance Equation 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Shibor_1d -0.005050 0.006191 0.343472*** 0.022836 
Shibor_1w 0.006192 0.005052 -0.008023 0.024588 
Shibor_2w -0.004545 0.003290 -0.213465*** 0.025045 
Shibor_1m -0.000131 0.001953 -0.157726*** 0.027847 
Shibor_3m 0.000638*** 0.000144 -0.098477** 0.048767 
Shibor_6m 0.001273*** 0.000170 0.979916*** 0.039826 
Shibor_9m -0.000104 0.000111 0.733284*** 0.050022 
Shibor_1y 0.001287*** 0.000214 0.965341*** 0.047463 
Bond_2y 0.000487 0.001537 0.039373 0.047745 
Bond_5y 0.003445 0.002419 -0.023150 0.041055 
Bond_10y 0.004402** 0.001829 -0.019744 0.045323 
Stock_SH -0.002889** 0.001211 -0.071987* 0.038854 
Stock_SZ -0.003684** 0.001435 -0.041071 0.039964 
ER_CNY/USD 0.000026 0.000171 0.811811*** 0.067076 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
2. Before, during and after the global financial crisis 
 
Next, I divide the sample period into three phases: pre-crisis period, crisis period and 
post-crisis period to scrutinize the evolutions of impact of PBoC communication on 
financial markets. The pre-crisis period lasts from the beginning of the sample 
(October 2006) to September 2008, during which period the PBoC basically 
maintained a tight monetary stance in order to contain the risk of economic overheating 
and high inflationary pressures. Starting from the third quarter of 2008, the PBoC 
conducted substantial monetary easing against the background of a rampant global 
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financial crisis. The last phase begins from early 2011, when the PBoC started to 
describe its monetary stance as “prudent” instead of “moderately loose”. This prudent 
stance has been maintained till the date when the dissertation is written. In order to 
compare the impacts of PBoC communication on financial markets before, during and 
after the crisis, I estimate the same mean and variance equations as I did in the 
previous sub-section for each of the three sub-samples respectively.  
 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the mean equation. Again, only coefficients of 
     variable are reported. The results show that before the crisis, PBoC 
communication plays a statistically significant role in moving 1-month, 6-month, 
9-month and 1-year Shibor as well as the 2-year and 10-year bond returns in the 
intended direction, but its impacts on other financial market indicators are either not 
significant or in a direction against the PBoC’s intention. During the crisis, impacts of 
PBoC communication on financial asset prices became more divergent and only 
significant for fewer cases, reflecting the uncertain market conditions as well as the 
limited knowledge and information of the PBoC facing the unprecedented crisis. 
Apparently, after the crisis, the PBoC communication performs more effectively in 
terms of moving the financial asset prices toward the intended direction. Specifically, 
all the money market interest rates and the 2-year bond yield rate move consistently in 
the direction as the PBoC desires following its communication. Only the 5-year and 
10-year long-term bond rates react differently to the PBoC communication, which is 
not a surprise according to theory. Except for the 1-month Shibor, all the other Shibor 
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rates are influenced by PBoC communication in a statistically significant way. The 
negative sign of coefficient for Shenzhen stock market return variable become 
significant at the 5% level after the crisis. In contrast, the foreign exchange market 
return changes surprisingly in an opposite direction. In sum, PBoC communication has 
been improving its effectiveness in moving money markets, bond markets and stock 
markets after the recent global financial crisis. 
 
Table 4. Before, during and after the global financial crisis – mean equation 
 
 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the variance equation estimations.     is adjusted to 0 
when there is communication with no monetary policy bias. It is visible that the 
financial asset price volatilities react to PBoC communication more consistently and 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Shibor_1d -0.013329 0.011568 -0.001713 0.005698 0.153588*** 0.032085 
Shibor_1w 0.006246 0.033549 0.006213* 0.003313 0.064769** 0.030133 
Shibor_2w -0.033581 0.022462 -0.003038 0.003024 0.088058*** 0.023821 
Shibor_1m 0.014185** 0.005832 -0.0000567 0.000928 0.019663 0.012769 
Shibor_3m -0.0000543 0.000265 -0.000352* 0.000214 0.002613*** 0.000332 
Shibor_6m 0.000317* 0.000168 0.000870*** 0.000211 0.002024*** 0.000236 
Shibor_9m 0.000253* 0.000131 0.00000684 0.000139 0.000203*** 0.0000754 
Shibor_1y 0.000739*** 0.000116 0.001026*** 0.000135 0.000195** 0.0000915 
Bond_2y 0.009471** 0.005131 -0.001318 0.002726 0.002116 0.003253 
Bond_5y 0.005028 0.005040 0.003021 0.004358 -0.004552 0.006563 
Bond_10y 0.007950** 0.003834 0.000753 0.003586 -0.001344 0.005737 
Stock_SH -0.000892 0.002910 -0.003185 0.002155 -0.003849 0.002380 
Stock_SZ -0.003061 0.003358 -0.001841 0.002597 -0.005779** 0.002904 
ER_CNY/USD 0.0000979 0.000168 0.00004 0.0000343 -0.000247 0.000725 
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significantly after the crisis, compared with the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Especially, 
the volatility of all money market interest rates, except for the 9-month Shibor, rises in 
a statistically significant way following PBoC communication events, implying that the 
PBoC messages convey information that markets perceive as new and relevant. The 
obvious more synchronized movements of monetary markets may be explained by an 
improvement of efficiency in those markets. 
 
Table 5. Before, during and after the global financial crisis – variance equation 
 
 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
3. A comparison of communication with monetary policy instruments 
 
Previous analysis has shown that central bank communication is working increasingly 
efficiently in moving financial asset price in China. Then a comparison of its 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Shibor_1d -0.260952*** 0.091615 1.526444*** 0.082718 1.236129*** 0.056250 
Shibor_1w 0.125623 0.081523 0.182626** 0.081126 0.867860*** 0.114914 
Shibor_2w -0.043283 0.113107 0.038993 0.083977 0.279811*** 0.061888 
Shibor_1m -0.957275*** 0.137251 -0.444258*** 0.106178 0.790493*** 0.094448 
Shibor_3m -1.124378*** 0.138213 -0.005719 0.156343 1.102408*** 0.230356 
Shibor_6m 0.325628** 0.151421 0.449246*** 0.138236 0.577864*** 0.109326 
Shibor_9m 0.266948 0.184224 0.160886 0.153586 -0.898422*** 0.256622 
Shibor_1y 1.909293*** 0.168304 0.761354*** 0.147276 0.668490*** 0.147108 
Bond_2y 0.365752* 0.191844 0.525575*** 0.135393 -0.960283*** 0.198437 
Bond_5y -0.432218*** 0.129903 -0.021689 0.074593 -0.347488 0.228589 
Bond_10y -0.503572*** 0.064976 -0.022923 0.067543 -0.296619 0.201302 
Stock_SH -0.141449 0.107297 0.041890 0.094379 0.042790 0.070491 
Stock_SZ -0.127634 0.104728 0.149194 0.131105 -0.070907 0.100468 
ER_CNY/USD 0.076950 0.150600 -0.964422*** 0.055789 -0.236223 0.285415 
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effectiveness and that of monetary policy instruments of the central bank becomes 
relevant. In addition to the      variable, Table 6 reports the coefficients of three 
controlled variables in the mean equation to catch the impacts of the benchmark 
lending and deposit rates (   ), reserve requirement ratio (    ) and open market 
operations (    ) on the financial market returns. 
 
For the pre-crisis sub-sample, coefficients of the     variable and the      variable 
are positive and significant for most cases of the money markets and the government 
bond markets, inferring the effectiveness of these monetary policy instruments in 
moving these markets, although they seem to work less effectively in the stock markets 
and the foreign exchange market. In comparison, as is described in the previous 
sub-section, coefficients of the      variable are significant and positive only for 
1-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year Shibor as well as 2-year and 10-year bond 
market returns. For other money markets, stock markets as well as the foreign 
exchange market, the coefficients of      are either insignificant or showing an 
undesired sign. A further comparison of the coefficients of the      variable with the 
coefficients of the     variable and the      variable for the case of 1-month, 
6-month, 9-month and 1-year Shibor shows that the      coefficients are much 
smaller than     coefficients, while slightly smaller than      coefficients. These 
observations evidence the small effectiveness of communication before the recent 
global financial crisis, relative to that of the monetary policy instruments at the 
disposal of the PBoC. 
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The post-crisis sub-sample unfolds a different picture. For all interest rates with a 
maturity up to 2 years as well as the stock market returns, the coefficients of      
show a desired sign and are significant for most cases. The     and the      
coefficients continue to show a sign as intended but are significant for fewer cases than 
the pre-crisis period, mostly for longer term interest rates. The absolute value of      
coefficients becomes even larger than that of the     and the      coefficients, in 
most cases of short-term interest rates and stock market returns. Therefore, there is 
evidence that communication has become an increasingly important tool for the PBoC 
to move financial market returns, especially money market interest rates, compared 
with its monetary policy instruments. Again, an exception is found in the foreign 
exchange market. Open market operations seem to have ambiguous influence on 
financial asset price movements for some reasons, but this issue falls out of the scope 





Table 6. A comparison of communication and monetary policy instruments – mean equation 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Shibor_1d 
COM -0.013329 0.011568 -0.001713 0.005698 0.153588*** 0.032085 
Shibor_1y 
COM 0.000739*** 0.000116 0.001026*** 0.000135 0.000195** 9.15E-05 
BR 0.068927 0.053558 0.014977 0.058203 0.031305 0.024876 BR 0.045912*** 0.004773 0.131000*** 0.006261 0.013186*** 0.004457 
RRR 0.027599 0.016780 0.043762** 0.019523 0.017230 0.088461 RRR 2.19E-05 0.000184 0.001157 0.001687 2.76E-05 0.000177 
OMO 0.001144 0.008405 -0.003037** 0.001237 0.007759** 0.003494 OMO 6.93E-06 8.47E-05 -8.97E-05 9.78E-05 -6.10E-05*** 1.04E-05 
Shibor_1w 
COM 0.006246 0.033549 0.006213* 0.003313 0.064769** 0.030133 
Bond_2y 
COM 0.009471* 0.005131 -0.001318 0.002726 0.002116 0.003253 
BR 0.103422*** 0.024760 0.080026 0.062500 0.014716 0.026670 BR 0.043651*** 0.013291 0.114687*** 0.013854 0.028469** 0.011660 
RRR 0.125992** 0.050186 0.005412 0.056297 0.160444** 0.075055 RRR 0.025765* 0.013691 0.047698*** 0.013318 0.027803*** 0.010642 
OMO 0.019169 0.015778 -0.003178 0.002374 0.006406 0.004593 OMO 0.001571 0.002192 0.001609 0.001255 -0.001049 0.001065 
Shibor_2w 
COM -0.033581 0.022462 -0.003038 0.003024 0.088058*** 0.023821 
Bond_5y 
COM 0.005028 0.005040 0.003021 0.004358 -0.004552 0.006563 
BR 0.183055*** 0.065053 0.017889 0.053162 0.071396** 0.028426 BR 0.047934*** 0.014230 0.118770*** 0.016992 0.029351** 0.012871 
RRR -0.061385 0.038364 0.068135** 0.034736 0.011787 0.040698 RRR 0.009457 0.009512 0.013505 0.011520 0.031511*** 0.008350 
OMO 0.016310 0.010743 -0.000704 0.001976 0.019456*** 0.006626 OMO -0.001472 0.002935 0.003369 0.002228 -0.000852 0.001137 
Shibor_1m 
COM 0.014185** 0.005832 -5.67E-05 0.000928 0.019663 0.012769 
Bond_10y 
COM 0.007950** 0.003834 0.000753 0.003586 -0.001344 0.005737 
BR 0.047745 0.030032 0.053976* 0.032626 0.008999 0.019176 BR 0.040004 0.024384 0.140186*** 0.012894 0.022737 0.015094 
RRR 0.039581*** 0.002786 0.008087 0.023195 -0.082643*** 0.029545 RRR 0.006362 0.006829 0.028569* 0.016232 0.029471*** 0.007390 
OMO -0.000977 0.001123 -0.001885*** 0.000565 0.001856 0.004347 OMO -0.001288 0.002475 0.001570 0.002164 0.000826 0.000957 
Shibor_3m 
COM -5.43E-05 0.000265 -0.000352* 0.000214 0.002613*** 0.000332 
Stock_SH 
COM -0.000892 0.002910 -0.003185 0.002155 -0.003849 0.002380 
BR 0.032677*** 0.003182 0.063325*** 0.007513 0.001223 0.008750 BR 0.017685*** 0.006667 -0.004169 0.008324 -0.001778 0.004532 
RRR -1.06E-05 0.000674 -8.42E-06 0.001557 0.006696** 0.002871 RRR -0.001759 0.009187 0.001314 0.006361 -0.002542 0.002349 
OMO -3.08E-05 0.000224 -7.85E-05 0.000171 -0.000103 0.000113 OMO -0.001587 0.001831 -0.004377*** 0.001522 -0.001162* 0.000602 
Shibor_6m 
COM 0.000317* 0.000168 0.000870*** 0.000211 0.002024*** 0.000236 
Stock_SZ 
COM -0.003061 0.003358 -0.001841 0.002597 -0.005779** 0.002904 
BR 0.014923*** 0.004006 0.103876*** 0.003812 0.014928* 0.007857 BR 0.019282** 0.009494 -0.002968 0.009120 -0.006595 0.005550 
RRR 0.000551** 0.000271 0.004326** 0.001968 0.003499* 0.001946 RRR -0.002265 0.012653 0.005681 0.009468 -0.004977* 0.002872 
OMO 1.80E-06 6.37E-05 8.48E-05 0.000160 4.20E-05 3.59E-05 OMO -0.002109 0.002144 -0.004993*** 0.001669 -0.001958*** 0.000644 
Shibor_9m 
COM 0.000253* 0.000131 6.84E-06 0.000139 0.000203*** 7.54E-05 
ER_CNY/
USD 
COM 9.79E-05 0.000168 4.00E-05 3.43E-05 -0.000247 0.000725 
BR 0.026009*** 0.004134 0.112476*** 0.005018 0.005022 0.003993 BR -2.88E-05 0.000945 -0.000624 0.000729 0.000458** 0.000179 
RRR 0.000908*** 0.000271 0.001786 0.002003 0.001674 0.001723 RRR -0.000213 0.000325 -4.06E-05 0.000202 4.29E-05 0.000172 
OMO 3.36E-05 6.86E-05 -0.000151 0.000115 1.62E-06 6.36E-06 OMO -1.61E-05 9.67E-05 -5.50E-05 3.76E-05 6.30E-05 6.79E-05 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7 reports the coefficients of three controlled dummy variables in the variance 
equation besides the dummy variable    , whose coefficient captures 
communication’s effect on financial volatility.     is adjusted to 0 when there is 
communication with no monetary policy bias. Coefficients of the other three controlled 
dummy variables respectively show the impact of benchmark lending and deposit rate 
changes (    ), reserve requirement ratio adjustments (    ) and open market 
operations (   ) on financial volatility.  
 
The first impression is that PBoC’s monetary tools generally become more able to 
move financial market volatility in a statistically significant way after the financial 
crisis compared with the crisis period. Another observation is that PBoC 
communication tends to influence financial market stability in the opposite direction to 
the benchmark lending and deposit rate adjustments. In other words, a complementary 
effect is observed between PBoC’s talks about its inclination of future monetary stance 
and its real actions to change benchmark lending and deposit rates. Particularly, in the 
short-term money markets, communication by the PBoC tends to raise the price 
volatility by providing information that is perceived by the market to be new and 
relevant, while the real actions to change benchmark lending and deposit rates seem to 
reassure the markets. Whereas the benchmark lending and deposit rates and reserve 
requirement ratio remain as the major tools to exert influence on the volatility of 
financial asset returns, communication has been gaining more weight. In the foreign 
exchange market, both communication and monetary policy instruments significantly 
influence volatility and communication tends to calm down the market. 
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Table 7. A comparison of communication and monetary policy instruments – variance equation 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Shibor_1d 
CD -0.260952*** 0.091615 1.526444*** 0.082718 1.236129*** 0.056250 
Shibor_1y 
CD 1.909293*** 0.168304 0.761354*** 0.147276 0.668490*** 0.147108 
BD 1.47535*** 0.243243 2.749575*** 0.635899 -1.468448*** 0.220279 BD 5.49572*** 0.40486 4.267901*** 0.853776 5.116553*** 0.310490 
RD -1.171692*** 0.162862 -0.466875 0.633027 1.263343*** 0.120393 RD 0.59853* 0.347617 1.150855* 0.603430 1.172389*** 0.280388 
OD 0.015836 0.100329 -0.613687*** 0.084462 -0.325521*** 0.015661 OD 0.65627*** 0.151804 0.161040 0.120364 -1.214296*** 0.044822 
Shibor_1w 
CD 0.125623 0.081523 0.182626** 0.081126 0.867860*** 0.114914 
Bond_2y 
CD 0.365752* 0.191844 0.525575*** 0.135393 -0.960283*** 0.198437 
BD -1.938676*** 0.319189 0.194098 0.418791 -0.688325*** 0.238319 BD 0.969613*** 0.304906 1.094776 0.745887 0.837648 0.691708 
RD 1.292869*** 0.134797 0.567078* 0.339006 1.737127*** 0.219336 RD 1.191254*** 0.401559 1.045792** 0.413852 0.829308*** 0.287155 
OD 0.297652*** 0.11142 1.043675*** 0.090692 -0.048770 0.044917 OD 0.112364 0.080904 0.236904** 0.114217 -0.000448 0.063826 
Shibor_2w 
CD -0.043283 0.113107 0.038993 0.083977 0.279811*** 0.061888 
Bond_5y 
CD -0.432218*** 0.129903 -0.021689 0.074593 -0.347488 0.228589 
BD 0.324117 0.254538 0.789161 0.494127 -0.847744*** 0.124391 BD 0.990776*** 0.291662 1.332937*** 0.330874 1.267662*** 0.341379 
RD 1.254835*** 0.174459 1.094675*** 0.424016 0.704482*** 0.087940 RD 0.809602*** 0.214188 -0.208556 0.312406 0.858738*** 0.175229 
OD -0.094273 0.104122 0.595372*** 0.093488 -0.055821*** 0.020632 OD 0.437042*** 0.116802 -0.400279*** 0.132227 -0.000537 0.055479 
Shibor_1m 
CD -0.957275*** 0.137251 -0.444258*** 0.106178 0.790493*** 0.094448 
Bond_10y 
CD -0.503572*** 0.064976 -0.022923 0.067543 -0.296619 0.201302 
BD 1.185992*** 0.295736 0.986750** 0.428386 -0.566817*** 0.196927 BD 0.661703*** 0.183591 0.477893 0.311682 1.287711*** 0.378441 
RD 1.897149*** 0.426769 1.141756*** 0.368881 1.098777*** 0.105770 RD 0.517012*** 0.131212 0.353765* 0.201096 0.338055 0.278865 
OD 0.145559*** 0.055493 0.487720*** 0.111226 0.045798 0.038200 OD 0.124166 0.113872 -0.451600*** 0.141360 -0.106508* 0.057087 
Shibor_3m 
CD -1.124378*** 0.138213 -0.005719 0.156343 1.102408*** 0.230356 
Stock_SH 
CD -0.141449 0.107297 0.041890 0.094379 0.042790 0.070491 
BD 4.066516*** 0.475129 2.138520*** 0.463806 2.121438*** 0.440662 BD -0.803917*** 0.301713 -0.471956 0.365525 0.370036** 0.152720 
RD 0.643793*** 0.205348 0.594179 0.366155 1.850792*** 0.245132 RD 1.034847*** 0.229093 0.502952** 0.200879 -0.351888*** 0.128126 
OD -0.245807* 0.132137 0.361479*** 0.137196 -0.444788*** 0.053883 OD -0.319258** 0.127233 -0.211795 0.140857 -0.075011*** 0.020781 
Shibor_6m 
CD 0.325628** 0.151421 0.449246*** 0.138236 0.577864*** 0.109326 
Stock_SZ 
CD -0.127634 0.104728 0.149194 0.131105 -0.070907 0.100468 
BD 5.080424*** 0.25562 2.266048*** 0.711887 2.628519*** 0.311158 BD -0.818141** 0.327866 -0.306146 0.465264 0.452172* 0.242630 
RD 0.944257*** 0.247367 1.382889** 0.569897 1.441931*** 0.286640 RD 1.036485*** 0.241109 0.922918*** 0.246430 -0.206010 0.177682 
OD -0.093614 0.135539 1.009591*** 0.130397 -0.328846*** 0.043352 OD -0.225850 0.140464 -0.443723*** 0.154507 -0.150368*** 0.028600 
Shibor_9m 
CD 0.266948 0.184224 0.160886 0.153586 -0.898422*** 0.256622 
ER_CNY/USD 
CD 0.076950 0.150600 -0.964422*** 0.055789 -0.236223 0.285415 
BD 4.611562*** 0.439148 3.083390*** 0.716858 4.926167*** 0.197620 BD 0.410381 0.418436 1.721229*** 0.211714 -2.211933*** 0.651535 
RD 1.623561*** 0.305466 1.226201** 0.571727 3.547653*** 0.132129 RD 0.208488 0.246027 -0.837525*** 0.170842 -0.490384 0.457375 
OD 0.146359 0.184516 -0.015107 0.122991 0.300948*** 0.044641 OD 0.294238* 0.166435 1.016060*** 0.083200 1.002013*** 0.074813 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level
43 
 
VI. Conclusions and implications 
 
The last two decades have seen a dramatic transformation of central banks from a 
secretive and arcane monetary authority toward an open and transparent financial 
market player that frequently exchange information and knowledge with the public. 
Research on central bank communication is spawning accordingly. This dissertation has 
conducted a comprehensive review of the relevant theoretical expositions underlining 
this evolution. Communication practices of major central banks and the PBoC have also 
been visited with a comparative perspective. By scrutinizing the connections between 
central bank communication and financial markets, I have indentified the research 
approach taken by the growing studies (mostly empirical) on this topic and also for my 
own dissertation. Based on this work, an empirical study engaging an EGARCH model 
has been conducted to examine the impact of central bank communication on financial 
markets, including the money market, the government bond market, the stock market 
and the foreign exchange market, in the case of China. This impact can be considered as 
an epitome of the effectiveness of the PBoC communication.  
 
First, an overall EGARCH estimation is conducted on the entire sample period from 
October 2006 to September 2015, to check impacts of central bank communication on 
financial markets in China during these nine years. In the case of the “price effect”, the 
result shows that PBoC communication generally tends to drive the money market 
interest rates to move in its intended way, especially for the case of 3-month, 6-month 
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and 1-year Shibor. Still, divergent reactions of interest rates of different maturities are 
significant enough to warrant noting here, which may suggest the lack of efficiency in 
the Chinese money markets. The situation in the stock market seems to be less 
ambiguous - stock yields react to PBoC communication toward the intended direction 
in a statistically significant way. As for the “volatility effect” of the PBoC 
communication on financial markets, the major finding is that volatilities of various 
financial markets generally react to the communication by the PBoC in a statistically 
significant way, whereas the volatility movements do not present a consistent pattern. 
Since the desirability of financial market volatility rises or reductions depends on the 
degree of uncertainty before the PBoC communication events and the clarity of 
communication messages, separate case studies may be required to understand and 
exposit the volatility changes in different financial market segments at different times.  
 
Further on, I compare the PBoC communication’s effects on financial markets before, 
during and after the recent global financial crisis and also compare the role of 
communication against that of monetary policy instruments of the PBoC. My key 
findings infer to a conclusion that communication has been playing an increasingly 
important role in efficiently managing market expectations and promoting monetary 
policy effectiveness, both in absolute terms (as explained in Section V - 2) and in 
relative terms (as explained in Section V - 3). On one hand, the PBoC communicates 
with the market more effectively after the crisis in the sense that it is able to move all 
money market interest rates as well as the stock market returns toward the intended 
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direction through communication, and the impact is statistically significant for most 
cases. The obvious more synchronized rises of monetary market volatilities after the 
global financial crisis imply that the PBoC messages convey information that markets 
perceive as new and relevant. On the other hand, compared with monetary policy 
instruments, communication’s effects become larger after the crisis and meanwhile a 
complementary effect is observed between PBoC’s talks about its inclination of future 
monetary stance and its real actions to change benchmark lending and deposit rates. 
 
Taking the preconditions of effective central bank communication into account, the 
greater effectiveness of PBoC communication after the global financial crisis, both in 
an absolute sense and in a relative sense, may be a result of a variety of factors that 
have allowed the PBoC to become a more qualified communicator, such as the 
on-going financial reforms and accumulated experiences in communication of the 
PBoC etc.  
 
Above all, despite the non-fully-independence status, the PBoC has become 
increasingly credible to the markets. Although it is widely hold by western scholars and 
central bankers that independence is a critical factor for central bank credibility, this is 
arguably not so true in the case of China. Given the well-known relationship between 
the PBoC and the State Council as well as the decision-making process of Chinese 
monetary policies, the markets tend to consider anything about future monetary stance 
said by the PBoC as having been approved by the State Council or at least being in 
46 
 
alignment with the goal of the central government. In other words, PBoC officials do 
not speak as frequently and freely as their counterparts in the advanced central banks do, 
but whenever they talk, the markets take what they say seriously and adjust their 
expectations accordingly. In addition, as accumulating more experiences in 
communication, the PBoC may become increasingly skillful in managing market 
expectations by delivering designed and clear messages to the markets.  
 
Meanwhile, Chinese financial markets may have been learning how to interpret the 
central bank’s messages and what further actions to expect from it. By learning and 
adapting, the market agencies with rational expectations can make decisions that lean 
toward the wind.  
 
Moreover, we can observe the role of financial market development and sophistication 
in incorporating news that is created by central bank communication. Improvement of 
financial market efficiency has facilitated the consistent reactions of short-, middle- and 
long-term money markets (at least the short- and middle-term ones) to the 
communication by the central bank of China.  
 
Finally, although the Chinese economy has been experiencing ups and downs but the 
degree of uncertainty is relatively smaller than that in previous years, and this may have 




The foreign exchange market seems to be an outlier, where PBoC communication is not 
evidenced to play a critical role, which is not a surprise if we notice the characteristics 
of Chinese foreign exchange market. 
 
Based on these conclusions, a few implications can be drawn. First, communication has 
become a reliable tool complementary to other monetary policy instruments that can be 
used by the PBoC to enhance monetary policy effectiveness. Second, in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of central bank communication and other monetary policies, 
the PBoC should continue to promote the marketization of financial asset prices and 
improve the financial market efficiency. In addition, the PBoC may want to continue to 
enhance its credibility by always walking the talk, and strengthening its analytical and 
forecast capacities as well as communication skills. Improving the ability of “reducing 
noises” by developing stronger analytical and forecast capacities is especially important 
for the PBoC to calm down the markets amid a crisis. The PBoC may also make more 
efforts to impart the public with financial knowledge so that the interaction between the 
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